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• We take baby names as an example to study cultural evolution.
• Rank–frequency distribution and temporal correlation of baby names are presented.
• We propose a stochastic model to illustrate observed empirical observations.
In social sciences, there is currently rare consensus on the underlying mechanism for
cultural evolution, partially due to lack of suitable data. The evolution of first names of
newborn babies offers a remarkable example for such researches. In this paper, we employ
the historical data on baby names from the United States to investigate the evolutionary
process of culture, in particular focusing on how inequality among baby names changes
over time. Then we propose a stochastic model where individual choice is determined by
both individual preference and social influence, and show that the decrease in the strength
of social influence can account for all the observed empirical features. Therefore, we claim
that the weakening of social influence drives cultural evolution.
1. Introduction
Cultural evolution is the dynamical process by which the popularity of cultural traits changes over time. Remarkably, at
all times the evolution presents the similar patterns: a relatively small number of cultural traits are highly popular while
the majority gets little attention [1–5]. Moreover, the level of such inequality varies along with the evolution of culture.
In the past decades, a wide range of studies have been carried out to uncover the mechanism generating inequality. One
explanation, presented by Rosen and MacDonald, is that inequality is caused by the differential quality of cultural traits
and can be reproduced by the convexity of the mapping from quality to popularity [6,7]. An alternative explanation, firstly
proposed by Adler, asserts that individual decision is influenced by the behaviors of others, which lead to inequality [8–10].
In order to test the validity of the theories, Hamlen empirically examined the relationship between voice quality
and record sales in the popular music industry [11], and discovered that the percentage change in record sales was
smaller than that in voice quality. This repudiated the explanation of Rosen and MacDonald. Recently, Salganik and Watts
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Fig. 1. The rank–frequency distribution of baby names. (a) shows the distributions in 1940. (b) shows the distributions of baby girl names in 1880, 1940,
1970 and 2010. By comparison, one can find that the shape of the distribution becomes increasingly flat over time. Baby boy names have similar statistical
characteristics.
investigated social influence in cultural markets by a well-designed web-based experiment. In the experiment, participants
may download previously unknown songs either with or without knowledge of previous participants’ choices [12,13].
Comparative experiment shows that social influence plays a vital role in the emergence of inequality. Some theoretical
explanations for the experimental findings have been proposed [14,15].
Besides the mechanism of inequality, how inequality evolves is also a core topic for cultural evolution. Because this
evolution is a relatively slow process in human society [16,17], the related researches demand the data over large time
scale. However, it is difficult to obtain such data. Therefore, so far little has been known about it. Luckily, the evolution of
first names of newborn babies offers a remarkable example for the researches. The data on baby names from the United
States span over 130 years. In this paper, we ground our analysis on the data and use standard statistical tools to gain some
empirical facts concerning inequality and its evolution over time. Guided by these empirical facts, we propose a stochastic
modelwhere individual choice is determined by both individual preference and social influence.We show that such amodel,
despite its simplicity, can account for the empirical observations with a high accuracy.
2. Data analysis
The data on first names are taken fromUS Social Security Administration, and contain the top 1000 boys’ and girls’ names
every year from 1880 to 2010 [18]. All names are from Social Security Card applications for births that occurred in the United
States after 1879. All data are from a 100% sample of the records on Social Security card applications as of the end of February
2011.
Firstly,we analyze the distribution of baby names and its evolution. The data suggest that the rank–frequency distribution
of baby names, which presents amathematical relation between the rank of each name ordered by decreasing frequency and
its frequency, is downward sloping [19]. As an example, the rank–frequency distributions of baby names in 1940 are shown
in Fig. 1(a). They present significant inequality. Through data analysis, we also find that the distribution of baby names is not
stable. For illustration, we choose four different years and present the respective distributions of baby girl names in Fig. 1(b),
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Fig. 2. The evolution of inequality. We employ Simpson’s index to measure inequality. We find that inequality level sustainedly declines with time except
for the period from 1909 to 1945.
fromwhich we can clearly see the evolution of the distribution. The given names change from few take all to a more equally
distributed way over time.
Secondly, we focus on the evolution of inequality. We use Simpson’s index to measure inequality among baby names
[20–22]. Simpson’s index is defined as the probability of any two individuals drawn at random from newborn babies
choosing the same first name, and is expressed as follows [23]:
I =
n∑
i=1
p2i , (1)
where pi denotes the frequency of baby name i, and n is the total number of first names. It ranges from 1/n (complete
equality) to one (maximum inequality). Simpson’s index is heavily weighted towards the frequently used names, while
being less sensitive to the total number of names [24]. Our data omit the names outside the top 1000, and thus Simpson’s
index is the most suitable measure of inequality for our studies. We calculate Simpson’s index for each year, and the results
are shown in Fig. 2, fromwhichwe can see that the level of inequality has a sustained decline except for the period from1909
to 1945. The data suggest that there is a sharp increase in the number of newborn babies during that period. The increase is
most likely caused by the huge influx of immigrants to the USA, which has a tremendous impact on cultural evolution and
leads to anomalous changes in inequality level [25].
Finally, we estimate temporal autocorrelation for the data on baby names. Consider two years t and t + t . The
frequencies of the same baby names are picked up from the data in the two years, and are placed in two sequences Xt
and Xt+t , respectively. Correlation is defined as Pearson’s correlation coefficient between the two sequences. Denote the
frequency of baby name i in the year t by xi,t . Then correlation can be computed as follows:
C(t,t) =
n∑
i=1
(xi,t − x¯t)(xi,t+t − x¯t+t)√
n∑
i=1
(xi,t − x¯t)2
√
n∑
i=1
(xi,t+t − x¯t+t)2
, (2)
where x¯t denotes the mean of the sequence Xt and n the total number of baby names which appear in the top 1000 in the
years t and t + t . The empirical results are shown in Fig. 3. For any given value of t , the correlation C(t,t) drops with
time t . It is worth noting that there was a sudden drop between the late 1960s and the early 1970s. It might be caused by
VietnamWar. During the course of the VietnamWar, anti-war movement profoundly affected American culture. This effect
was also presented in the pattern of temporal autocorrelation.
3. The Stochastic model for cultural evolution
To obtain deeper insight into cultural evolution, we propose a stochastic model to reproduce all the observed empirical
features. In the artificial society, there are N names to choose from. Time is discrete. At each time step, B new individuals
are born and choose names based on their evaluations for these names. Sociologists pointed out that individual evaluation
is dependent not only on individual preference but also on social influence [26]. This is consistent with our intuition: people
tend to choose names favored all by themselves and others. Based on this, we give the formula of individual i’s evaluation
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Fig. 3. The temporal autocorrelation plots for different values of t . The linear fits to the data show that the correlation C(t,t) drops with time t .
0.1
0.01
1E-3
1E-4
1E-5
1E-6
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
1 10 100 1000 10000
Rank
Fig. 4. The rank–frequency distribution of baby names, resulting from computer simulation with N = 6000, B = 250, τ = 100, ω = 0.005 and R = 4000.
for name α at time t as follows:
piαt = ω QiαtN∑
β=1
Qiβt
+ (1 − ω)
t−1∑
t ′=t−τ
aαt ′
N∑
β=1
t−1∑
t ′=t−τ
aβt ′
, (3)
where Qiαt measures individual i’s preference to name α at time t , aαt ′ is the number of occurrences of name α at time
t ′, and ω represents the weight of individuality in the selection process. In reality, people tend to choose recently popular
names more frequently than old ones [27–31]. Thus, in Eq. (3), we only consider the number of occurrences of each name in
recent τ time steps when expressing the effect of social influence on individual evaluation. For simplicity, we additionally
assume that all names are identical for every individual at any time step. Besides, according to the settings of the model,∑N
β=1
∑t−1
t ′=t−τ aβt ′ is equal to τB. Therefore, Eq. (3) changes to the following form:
piαt = ω/N + (1 − ω)
t−1∑
t ′=t−τ
aαt ′/(τB). (4)
Individuals will choose names with the probability proportional to their evaluations for names computed by Eq. (4).
Note that, such simplification implies an assumption that all individuals are homogeneous for large ω → 1, hence
eliminates the difference between individuals and consequentlyweakens the social influence. Thus, the increase ofωmeans
simultaneously decreasing the strength of social influence. We then run computer simulations of the stochastic model.
When the change in Simpson’s index becomes very small (e.g., in the order of 10−5), we consider that the artificial society
reaches the steady state. Afterwards, we collect the number of occurrences of each name in R time steps. As shown in
Fig. 4, the rank–frequency distribution of baby names is downward sloping, whose shape is quite similar to the empirical
distributions.
4
ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
Fig. 5. The temporal autocorrelation is plotted against ω. The results are from computer simulations with N = 6000, B = 250, τ = 100 and t = 1
(corresponding to 1000 time steps).
a
b
Fig. 6. The evolution of baby names shown by computer simulations. (a) shows the evolution of the rank–frequency distribution, resulting from the
simulations with N = 6000, B = 250, τ = 100, R = 4000 and ω = 0.005 (black); ω = 0.01 (red); ω = 0.015 (blue); ω = 0.02 (green). The shape
of the distribution becomes flatter with increasing ω. (b) shows the change in inequality level with ω. When ω increases, inequality level decreases. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
At present, a vital issue to be solved iswhat factor drives the process of cultural evolution. The cluemight be hidden in the
pattern of temporal autocorrelation, since the evolution is closely related with time. Through the above analysis, we have
known that temporal autocorrelation sustainedly declines over time. Such decaysmight be caused by less and less important
role of social influence in the process of selection. We test the conjecture by computer simulations. The results are shown
in Fig. 5, from which we can see that the decrease in the strength of social influence (i.e., the increase in ω) really induces
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the decline of temporal autocorrelation. Most probably, this factor is also the driving force of cultural evolution. We confirm
whether it can account for the evolutions of rank–frequency distribution and inequality. The simulation results are shown
in Fig. 6. We find that the shape of the rank–frequency distribution becomes increasingly flat and inequality level decreases
as the strength of social influence decreases, which is extremely similar to the empirical observations. These results indicate
that the decrease in the strength of social influence can really generate the observed evolution patterns. Thus, we assert that
the weakening of social influence drives cultural evolution.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we take baby names as an example to both empirically and theoretically investigate cultural evolution. In
the empirical studies, firstly we find that the rank–frequency distribution of baby names is downward sloping and its shape
becomes increasingly flat over time. Secondly, we use Simpson’s index tomeasure inequality among baby names and reveal
the sustained decline of inequality level. Thirdly, we define temporal autocorrelation and indicate its decaying with time.
To uncover the factor that drives the evolution of culture, we propose a simple stochastic model where individual choice
is determined by both individual preference and social influence. Computational simulations show that the decrease in the
strength of social influence can produce the patterns quite similar to the empirical observations. Based on this, we claim
that the weakening of social influence drives cultural evolution.
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